A critical analysis of the EU legal provisions on terrorism by O'Neill, Maria
 1 
A Critical analysis of the EU legal provisions on Terrorism 
 
Maria O’Neill,  
BCL, LLM, M.Ed., Solicitor, 
Lecturer in Law,  
University of Abertay Dundee, 
Bell Street, 
Dundee DD1 1HG, 
Scotland. 
Tel: 00 44 1382 308421 
Fax: 00 44 1382 308400 
E-mail: m.oneill@abertay.ac.uk 
 
This article operates as an introduction to the EU legal provisions on 
terrorism, to include, not just its content, but also its very important legal 
context. The potential for the development of this very important area of 
law is hampered by the legal framework within which it operates, and the 
variety of actors operating in this field at an EU level. This paper is 
addressed to an audience who is familiar with the policy area of 
terrorism, but is perhaps less familiar with the EU legal provisions and 
legal framework in this area.  
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1. Introduction     
 
The European Union classifies terrorism under the heading of EU 
policy on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Its current focus in this area is 
in what is known as the Hague Programme, which covers ten priority 
action points, one of which is terrorism.1 The Hague programme, which 
was launched on the 10th May 2005, states that the “Union’s attention 
must focus on different aspects of prevention, preparedness and 
                                        
1
 1. Fundamental Rights and citizenship, 2. the fight against terrorism, 3. Migration management, 4. 
Internal borders, external borders and visas, 5. a common asylum area, 6. Integration: the positive 
impact of migration on our society and economy, 7. Privacy and security in sharing information, 8. the 
fight against organised crime, 9. Civil and criminal justice: an effective European area of justice for all, 
and 10. Freedom, Security and Justice: sharing responsibility and solidarity. 
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response,” to include “the reduction of access to financial and economic 
resources by terrorists”. In order to facilitate the development of EU 
strength in this area, there is a need to exchange “information relevant to 
the investigation of terrorist activities”, and the “protection of critical 
infrastructure”, to include the creation of a “Critical Infrastructure 
Warning Information Network (CIWIN)”, together with policies for the 
support of  “victims of terrorist acts”.2  
 
The Tampere European Council of October 1999 placed the objective 
of the “progressive establishment of the area of freedom, security and 
justice” “at the head of the Union’s political agenda and set a very 
ambitious programme”.3 This approach was reinforced at the Santa Maria 
de Feira European Council in June 2000. 
 
The structure of the European Union created by the Maastricht Treaty4 
caused much concern amongst legal academics, to include the nature of 
the law in this area, the legal tools being used, and the lack of adequate 
human rights protection in this area. A widely adopted legal interpretation 
of the situations was given by Curtain5 when she described the (then) new 
EU as having a three pillar structure, much as an ancient Greek temple, 
with the first pillar being the largest and most developed EC, benefiting 
from the principles of supremacy and direct effect, EC law having a 
complete and almost immediate effect within the jurisdictions of all of the 
member states of the EC. The second pillar, was to be known as the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), dealing with issues such 
as diplomacy, and what was to become the European Security and 
Defence Identity (ESDS), which has since lead to the creation and 
operation of EUFOR,6 with the third pillar being then known as Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA). The then JHA pillar, now known since the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 as the Police and Judicial Co-operation Pillar, 
is where anti-terrorist measures would be located, although there would 
be times when there would be a blurring of the boundary line between 
JHA provisions and the other two pillars, particularly with regard to the 
Free Movement of Capital, one of the EC’s core principles with the 
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 The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years, A partnership for European renewal 2. 
A Union against terrorism; The fight against terrorism, Working toward a global response, available 
from the Europa website (http://www.europa.eu.int).  
3
 Communication from the Commission to the council and the European Parliament Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientation, (SEC (2004) 680 
and SEC(2004)693, Brussels 2.6.2004, COM (2004)401 final 
4
 Treaty on European Union, O.J. C191, 29th July 1992 
5
 Curtin D, "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: a Europe of bits and pieces" (1993) 30 
CMLRev 17 
6
 The small but active EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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money laundering legal provisions being dealt with using the EC legal 
tools of directives. 
 
 
2. The EU Terrorism Provisions   
 
While a writer on the political development on the EU’s provisions 
dealing with terrorism might focus on the European Council Declaration 
of the 25th March 2004 on the seven strategic objectives for the EU’s 
Action against Terrorism, the legal provisions in this area have been 
limited. The legal basis for EU provision on terrorism are Articles 29 to 
42 EU,7 otherwise known at Title VI EU. Further to these provisions two 
framework decisions8 and two joint actions9 have been enacted 
specifically addressing issues relevant to terrorism.   
  
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA10 on combating 
terrorism now applies not only to all 25 member states of the EU, (on the 
basis that any member state joining the EU has to take upon itself the 
acquis Union, or all the laws and developments of the laws in force 
within the Union at the time that it joins the Union, but also, pursuant to 
Article 12 of said Framework Decision, to Gibraltar, which is not in 
itself, or as part of the UK, a member of the EU.11 One of the first 
problems with regard to terrorism was the need for a common definition 
for terrorism, to be set out at an EU level, and applied in all EU member 
states.12  Terrorism is therefore defined in Article 1 of Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA. Terrorism in the EU is now to include actions 
which “may seriously damage a country or an international organisation” 
which have the aim of “seriously intimidating a population”, “unduly 
compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or 
abstain from performing any act”, or “seriously destabilising or 
                                        
7
 formerly known as Articles K.1 to K.14, of which more later in this paper. 
8
 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 3 June 2002 on combating terrorism OJ L22/6/2002, 
164/3, and Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims 
in criminal proceedings, OJ L 22/3/2001, 82/1 
9
 Joint Action 96/610/JHA on the creation of a Directory of specialist counter terrorism skills, OJ. L 
273, 25.10.1995, p. 1, and Joint Action 98/733/JHA on making it a criminal offence to participate in a 
criminal organisation, OJ L 29/12/98, L 351/1 
10
 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 3 June 2002 on combating terrorism OJ L22/6/2002, 
164/3, 
11
 the relevant member of the EU being the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
which does not normally include the Isle of Man, the channel islands or Gibraltar. In contrast it is 
France Outremere, rather than France Maritime which has joined the EU, therefore territories such as 
French Guyana, Martinique, Réunion etc. are part of “France” for the purposes of EU membership and 
are fully involved in EU matters.  
12
 For the purposes of Criminal law it must be recalled that the UK is itself comprised of a number of 
different legal jurisdictions, with, for example, different offences and processes operating on either side 
of the Scottish – English border. 
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destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organisation”. For its part a 
terrorist group is defined as “a structured group of more than two persons, 
established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist 
offences”.13 Offences linked with terrorist activities is defined as being 
aggravated theft, extortion or the drawing up of false administrative 
documents with a view to committing one of the offences defined in 
Article 1 of the Framework Decision.14  
 
Offences against persons cover the doing, or the threatening to 
attack an individual in a way which may cause death, attack the physical 
integrity of a person, “kidnapping or hostage taking”, are all included. 
Offences against institutions or property include the doing or threatening 
to “cause extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a 
transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information 
system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or 
private property likely to endanger human life or result in major 
economic loss”.15 Also included is the seizure of any method of public or 
goods transport, “the release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, 
floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life”, or the 
“interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other 
fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human 
life”. Of course the “manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport 
supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons, “ to include the “research to, and development of, 
biological and chemical weapons”, or threatening to do so, is also to be 
deemed to be a terrorist offence under this Framework Decision. It is felt 
that this above definition is “unacceptably broad” and is likely to infringe 
Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
requires that for a legal provision to be “lawful” under the ECHR that “an 
individual should be able to know” from reading the relevant document 
“what acts or omissions he/she can be held liable”.16  
 
In addition to the standardising of definitions throughout the EU, with 
the Framework Decision requiring national laws to be amended where 
differences between their provisions and those of the Framework 
Decision arise, the Framework Decisions required that EU member states 
to ensure that the offences referred to in the Framework Directive are 
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 Article 2.1 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
14
 Article 3 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
15
 Article 1(d) of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
16
 Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh; The rule of law in the European Union – Putting the security in the area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, E.L.Rev.2004, 29(2), 219-242  
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“punishable be effective, proportional and dissuasive criminal penalties, 
which may entail extradition”.17  The level of these penalties are not 
however specified, but are to be reducible if any of the circumstances in 
Article 6 of the Framework Directive occur, namely, renouncing terrorist 
activity, together with providing specified types of assistance to the 
relevant administrative or judicial authorities. Inciting, aiding or abetting 
a terrorist offence, or attempting to commit a terrorist offence is also to be 
legislated for, if it has not done so already, in each of the EU member 
states, with member states being required to take all the necessary 
measures to create these offences.18 The reference to extradition is also of 
interest, as the EU’s European Arrest Warrant is now fully operational19 
throughout the EU, and also in Gibraltar.   
 
 Penalties for terrorism are not set out in the Framework Directive, 
with the EU merely requiring that “each Member State shall take the 
necessary measure to ensure that” the penalties are “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive”, which may also “entail extradition”, with a 
reduction in penalty to be provided should an individual renounce 
terrorist activity, or provide “the administrative or judicial authorities 
with information which they would not otherwise have been able to 
obtain” with regard to preventing terrorism, or prosecuting other 
participants in the act of terrorism.20 Provisions must also be provided in 
national legislation for the liability21 and punishment22 of legal persons 
with regard to terrorism offences. The issue of jurisdiction and which EU 
member state is to prosecute for a terrorist offence is also covered,23 as is 
the issue of the granting of protection and assistance to witnesses,24 a 
matter which is also covered by the more broadly focused Council 
Framework Decision of 15th March 2001 on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings.25  
 
 The Council Framework Decision on Terrorism is complimented 
by the Arrest Warrant Framework Decision,26 both documents having 
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 Article 5 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
18
 Article 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
19
 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190 of 18.07.2002 
20
 Article 6 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
21
 Article 7 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
22
 Article 8 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
23
 Article 9 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
24
 Article 10 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
25
 Council Framework Decision of 15th March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings 
(2001/220/JHA) OJ L82/1, 22.3.2001. 
26
 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures between member States, O.J. 2002, L 190/1 
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been passed exceptionally swiftly.27 This swiftness in passing of law was 
seen to be an exercise in exceptionally efficient law making, however 
there is a tension between “democratic accountability and efficiency”,28 
with the lack of democratic input and control being a major concern, 
along with the issue of the rule of law and the protection of human rights, 
to legal academic commentators on this area of law.29  
 
 The Arrest Warrant Framework Decision for its part is seen as a 
“genuine paradigm shift in legal co-operation between Member States”, a 
paradigm which will be expected to be seen in the operation of the 
Council Framework Decision on Terrorism. Traditionally states have 
been wary of each others laws, with the norm being that one state not 
enforcing the rulings of another jurisdiction, unless specifically agreed to 
do so, under narrowly drafted extradition treaties. This document 
however operates on the principle, with some exceptions, that EU 
member states will “automatically recognise each other’s judicial 
decisions ordering the arrest of a person”.30 This approach reflects a “high 
level of confidence between Member States”.31 It should be noted that 
political offences are not one of the specified exceptions to the Arrest 
Warrant Framework Decision, bringing an end to “an era of sympathy 
with politically motivated rebellion.32 It is felt by some that the lack of 
Human Rights provisions at an EU level is mitigated given that all 
member states of the EU are bound by the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which, through interpretation by the 
European Court of Human Rights “in effect” leads “to quite a high level 
of protection”.33 
 
 In addition is should be noted that Europol, Eurojust34 and the 
European Judicial Network in Criminal Matters35 (set up pursuant to a 
joint action),36 all have a part to play when it comes to combating 
terrorism. Europol’s capacity to deal with terrorism issues were 
                                        
27
 Wouters, Jan and Naert, Frederik; Of arrest warrants, terrorist offences and extradition deals: an 
appraisal of the EU’s main criminal law measures against terrorism after “11 September”, CMLRev. 
41: 909-935, 2004 
28
 Op. cit. footnote no. 16.  
29
 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott; The rule of law in the European Union – Putting the security in the area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, E.L.Rev.2004, 29(2), 219-242 and Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert; Of 
arrest warrants, terrorist offences and extradition deals: an appraisal of the EU’s main criminal law 
measures against terrorism after “11 September”, CMLRev. 41: 909-935, 2004 
30
 Op. cit. footnote no. 27. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 http://www.eurojust.eu.int 
35
 http://www.ejn-crimjust.eu.int 
36
 Joint Action of 29 June 1998 adopted by Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network, (98/48/JHA), OJ L. 191/4 
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“augmented” subsequent to 11/11 by the creation of a team of “counter 
terrorist experts” at Europol.37 This team operates through “agreements 
with the US”, laising with Eurojust, and the development of joint 
investigation teams between law enforcement bodies in different member 
states.38 This is all complimented by judicial and police co-operation, 
peer review of national legal systems, and the drafting of a “common 
scale for assessing threats to visiting public figures”.39   
 
 Europol causes lawyers concern as its control mechanisms are 
“extremely fragmented and lacking in transparency”,40 operating with 
“minimal supervision”, with a “lack of independent scrutiny and 
management”,41 from either EU bodies or from the member states of the 
EU. These criticisms of Europol, staffed by law enforcement officers, of a 
lack of judicial and parliamentary scrutiny is also echoed with regard to 
Eurojust, staffed by judges, with regard to the lack of parliamentary 
control.42 It should also be noted at this point that an Anit-terrorism Co-
ordinator has been appointed, and a “declaration on combating terrorism 
and on solidarity against terrorism” has been adopted.43 The Schengen 
Information system, originally set up pursuant to the Schengen 
Convention is also plays its part in the EU’s counter terrorism measures.  
 
 More broadly within the PJCCM pillar, the creation of a European 
Public Prosecutor’s office is being debated. Should such an office be 
created it would undoubtedly have an effect on the development of the 
EU’s counter terrorism measures. On the legislative front, two other 
important documents, both passed pursuant to the post-Maastricht, pre-
Amsterdam provisions on JHA, as reflected in their titles in their 
reference to K.3, (now, as amended, Article 31 EU), are the Joint Action 
98/733/JHA, dealing with membership of a criminal organisation,44 and 
Joint Action 96/610/JHA setting up a directory of specialized counter-
terrorist competences, skills and expertise.45 
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 Op. cit. footnote no. 16. 
38
 Op. cit. footnote no. 27. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Op. cit. footnote no. 16.  
41
 Ibid.   
42
 Ibid.   
43
 Op. cit. footnote no. 27. 
44
 98/733/JHA  Joint Action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
of the Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal 
organisation in the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 351.1, 29.12.98 
45
 96/610/JHA: Joint Action of 15 October 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of 
the Treaty on European Union concerning the creation and maintenance of a Directory of specialized 
counter-terrorist competences, skills and expertise to facilitate counter-terrorist cooperation between 
the Member States of the European Union, OJ. L 273, 25/10/1996, p. 1.  
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3. The EU legal framework in which the terrorism provisions are 
set   
 
The legal framework within which the EU terrorism and terrorist 
related provisions have been enacted have a strong influence on the 
operation of the law in this area. This is particularly so as the nature of 
law in the PJCCM pillar of the EU is not like that of the much more 
coherent and effective EC law of the first pillar of the EU. The flaws in 
the PJCCM legal system have been widely accepted, with radical changes 
having been written into the proposed EU Constitution, which had, 
unfortunately for lawyers interested in this area, been mired by political 
considerations.  
 
 The legal tools in the area of Justice and Home Affairs have 
changed in recent years. Justice and Home Affairs was initially legislated 
for under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which used the numbering A, B, 
C etc, hence the numbering for Justice and Home Affairs once having the 
numbering K.1, 2… etc. The Maastricht treaty, also known as the Treaty 
on European Union provided, in article K.3, that the legal tools in the area 
of JHA were to be joint positions, joint actions and conventions “which it 
shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements”. Conventions are also known 
as International Treaties, and are the principal legal tool of International 
law. International law commonly splits into Public International law, 
being agreements between states, dealing with relationships between 
those states, and Private International law, being agreements between 
states, but dealing with relationships between their citizens or subjects, on 
topics such as international contracts, or family law cases. International 
law impacts on national law depending on whether the relevant national 
jurisdiction is monist, dualist, or a hybrid of both. This is what is meant 
by “their respective constitutional requirements”. A monist legal 
jurisdiction sees no difference between national law and international 
law. Japan would be a typical example of this, although it appears to be 
reviewing its position on this point.46  
 
The UK is a typical example of a dualist legal system, seeing 
international law and domestic law as being two distinct jurisdictions. For 
the UK international law only affects the domestic jurisdictions47 after 
                                        
46
 See the Japanese case, Kyoto Neckties, which deals with the relationship between Japanese law and 
World Trade Organisation law: Judgment of June 29, 1984, Kyoto District court, 31 Shōmu Geppō 207, 
which seems to have been endorsed by the Judgment of Feb. 6, 1990, Supreme Court, slip op. 
47
 The UK, unlike its fellow EU member states, is in fact a number of domestic legal jurisdictions, inter 
alia, 1. England and Wales, 2. Scotland, and 3. Northern Ireland. 
 9 
domestic legislation has been passed implementing the international legal 
commitments into national law. Most EU member states are a hybrid 
between these two extremes. It should be noted however that EC law, and 
also PJCCM law, are not classified as International law, although that is 
clearly their origin. EC law is seen as being sui juris, or one of a kind, 
and automatically affects UK law (those jurisdictions within the UK48 
who have joined the EC49). EU PJCCM law is currently under 
development, and while it still has to be properly classified, it can be seen 
as being a hybrid between EC law and International law, with one of its 
legal tools, the Convention, or International Treaty being clearly an 
International law legal tool. The institutions of the EC, specifically the 
Council, Commission, ECJ and the European Parliament have been 
“borrowed” by the EU for its purposes. However these EC institutions 
operate in a different manner in the pillar II (CFSP) and Pillar III 
(PJCCM) policy areas than they do under Pillar I, EC matters. Under 
PJCCM while the EC’s principal court, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which is based in Luxembourg, was to continue to deal with 
disputes between member states, or between the institutions and the 
member states in JHA matters, unlike under EC law, there was no access 
by an individual to the ECJ in this policy area. 
  
The area of JHA was however radically altered by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which came into force in 1997, with a large part of Justice and 
Home Affairs being moved from pillar 3 (which was then to become the 
PJCCM pillar), to pillar 1, the EC, and becoming Title IV EC, “Visas, 
Asylum, Immigration and other matters dealing with the Free Movement 
of Persons”. It should be pointed out at this stage that the free movement 
of EC nationals in their capacity as workers has always been a core EC 
policy area. The free movement of persons to be covered in the new Title 
IV being the free movement of non-EC nationals, or as referred to in EC 
legal texts, 3rd country nationals. In addition, while it is not referred to in 
the title to Title IV, judicial co-operation in civil matters (as opposed to 
criminal matters) was transferred from pillar III to pillar I of the EU. The 
consequences of this was that pillar I matters operate in a much more 
coherent legal framework than would be the case in Pillar III, with the 
very clear principles of supremacy and direct effect permeating all EC 
law, and the very clear legal tools of EC regulations, directives and 
decisions being used here, in contrast to the more difficult legal tools 
being used in Pillar III of the EU. In addition access to the ECJ for 
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 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
49
 the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands are not in the EC/EU, and are therefore not subject to either 
EC or EU legal provisions. 
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individuals is clearer in Pillar I, although for ex-JHA matters, is not the 
same as for the balance of EC law.  
 
Normally any court or tribunal of an EC member state before 
whom an EC legal point is being argued, can if they are unclear about the 
law, make a reference to the ECJ under Article 234 EC (ex. Article 177 
EC) to ask for clarity on the legal point in issue. Having received the 
ruling from the ECJ, which then applies throughout the EC, the local 
court or tribunal then applies the law to the facts of the case. Under Title 
IV EC only the court or tribunal of final appeal can make the reference.50 
This would mean that a case, in civil law, would have to be appealed all 
the way to the House of Lords, adding time and expense, before a 
reference could be made to the ECJ, thereby compromising the quality 
and unity of interpretation of the law in this area, in comparison to the 
balance of EC law.   
 
As a corollary to this issue, the Amsterdam Treaty inserted access 
to the ECJ in Pillar III, now to be known as PJCCM, in Article 35 EU, 
but provided for 3 options, at the selection of each member state. These 
work out as no access to the ECJ for PJCCM matters, the current UK 
position, access from any court or tribunal, the mainstream EC method, 
access only from the highest court or tribunal, which if this option applied 
in Scotland would be High Court of Justiciary, unless it issue in question 
is a devolution issue, as defined by the Scotland Act 1998, then the 
highest court would be the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.51  
These devolution issues would normally be about Human Rights issues, 
not a matter for the EU, but rather the International law based 
organisation of the Council of Europe, based in Strasbourg, of which 
more later. In England and Wales, the highest court of appeal in Criminal 
cases would be the House of Lords. Three options for access to the ECJ 
in PJCCM matters can only lead to what many are calling a Multi-speed 
Europe or “variable geometry”.   
 
A further “variable geometry” was added to the mix by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, when it integrated the pre-existing international law 
treaty, the Schengen Convention 1990, which implemented the Schengen 
Agreement 1985 into mainstream EU law. The Amsterdam Treaty 
integrated the Schengen Convention into both pillar I EU, the EC, and 
Pillar III, PJCCM, with those bits, which most closely fit the relevant 
pillar being integrated into those pillars. However two EC/EU member 
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 Under Article 64 EC. 
51
 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is in reality is the House of Lords in a different 
formation to the usual. 
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states where not members of the pre-existing Schengen Convention, and 
wished to continue outside its framework, namely, the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland. In addition two member states of the Schengen 
Convention were not, and did not want to join the EC/EU, namely 
Norway and Iceland. For these latter countries all Schengen commitments 
must necessarily remain as International law obligations.  
 
To add to the mix, Denmark, which was very happy with Schengen as 
International law, did not want any of it to form part of its EC law 
commitments. Denmark was happy to have part of Schengen as pillar III, 
but those parts which for everybody else was to become EC law, namely 
issues dealing with visas, asylum, immigration and other matters dealing 
with the free movement of 3rd country nationals, were to remain as 
international law commitments for Denmark. This approach reflected the 
very differing nature of the more robust and effective EC law in 
comparison to the looser EU law and the very difficult to enforce nature 
of International law. All of these variations were dealt with by way of 
protocols52 attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. It should also be noted that 
the Amsterdam Treaty renumbered both the EC and EU treaty, just to add 
to the confusion.  
 
Not only is Schengen relevant to terrorism issues, but so too is the 
International law based Europol Convention 1995. This document, which 
all, and only, EU member states are party to, set up the European Police 
Office in the Hague, Netherlands,53 not to be confused with Interpol’s 
European Committee, based in Lyon, France. It will therefore be with 
some relief to readers that the later Nice Treaty, which came into force in 
2003 had little effect on this policy area, with the proposed EU 
Constitution, should it ever come into force, being the next legal 
document to develop this policy area.  
 
The post -Amsterdam version of the Treaty on European Union 
provides, at Article 34 EU, that the legal tools are to be common 
positions, framework decisions, decisions and conventions. Framework 
Decisions are defined as being “binding upon the Member States as to the 
result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods”. To a certain extent these Framework Decisions 
resemble EC Directives, however they differ from EC Directives as 
Framework Decisions are not to have direct effect. Direct effect is a very 
important legal effect used to add to the coherence of EC law. Framework 
decisions are also to be used for the approximation of the laws of EU 
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 Protocols are legally biding exceptions to treaties 
53
 http://www.europol.eu.int 
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member states, unlike EC law, which is said to be used for the purpose of 
“harmonisation” or at times unification of law.  
 
 
4. Proposals for reform under the proposed EU Constitution    
 
 In addition to the variable geometry issues which currently arise, as 
discussed above, due to the various protocol opt outs, which will continue 
with a wide range of protocols having been attached to the proposed EU 
Constitution, a number of very serious problems arise with the current 
structure of PJCCM provisions. The three options for access to the ECJ, 
under Article 35 EU, is less than satisfactory. In addition the nature of the 
legal documents operating in PJCCM, together with the lack of clarity as 
to the exact nature of PJCCM law is causing serious concerns. The 
problems of International law is permeating the area of PJCCM, in 
particular as one of the legal tools is the Convention, or International 
Treaty, with its monist/dualist constraints. A number of EU jurisdictions 
require referenda in order to accede to certain International treaties “in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”, thereby 
causing uncontrollable problems in the developing of law in this area. 
The other PJCCM legal tools are also not without their own problems. 
Europol is also operating in the relative legal wilderness of International 
law, unlike many other European legal structures, such as the European 
Central Bank, which is operating within the clearly defined and easily 
operateable and enforceable EC legal framework. The reason for this 
legal problem is national politics, and the reluctance of EU member states 
to cede sovereignty to the supranational legal entity of the EC in policing 
and criminal law matters. This is again the problem being encountered 
with the proposed, signed but not yet in force EU Constitution.  
 
The “EU Constitution” is not, despite its name, a constitution, but 
another International Treaty. Unlike earlier EC/EU treaties, the EU 
Constitution does not propose amending earlier EC or EU treaties, but 
proposes creating a new EU, with one pillar, integrating PJCCM 
provisions into the main body of the “new EU law”, benefiting from the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect, with the standard method of 
approaching the ECJ applying to this policy area, and utilising the same 
legal tools as will be used for what are now the main policy areas of the 
EC. These new legal tools, not currently in use anywhere in the EC or EU 
legal structure, will be European laws, European Framework laws, 
European regulations and European decisions, pursuant to Article I-33 of 
the EU Constitution. In addition it is intended to give legal capacity to the 
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EU, something only the EC, and not the current EU, enjoys.54 The 
European Commission is particularly anxious to “mainstream” PJCCM 
matters in this way, in order to ensure that the law is better constructed 
and thereby more effective in this area. This however has serious political 
consequences as there will be, as a consequence further transfer of power 
from national governments and judiciary to “Brussels”. 
 
The EU Constitution, as currently drafted, has four chapters, 
denoted in Roman numerals. It exhibits very much a “cut and paste” 
approach to legislative drafting, with Title III being very much the current 
EC treaty, cut and pasted in, with some amendments. Of particular 
relevance to the issue of terrorism is the fact that Title II of the EU 
Constitution operates as a “cut and paste” of the current Charter of Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, otherwise known as the Nice Charter.55 The 
Nice Charter currently sits in the vague area of EU law, expressing many 
fine objectives, but not being regarded as “hard” law, of any use in any 
court. The moving of its provisions into Title II EU would make its 
provisions much more effective. This is important as the neither the 
current EC nor EU are members of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The EU cannot be a member of any organisation, as it has no 
legal capacity to sign anything. Currently any agreement which the EU 
wishes to participate in within the field of PJCCM has to be signed by 
each member states of the EU in their own capacity. The EC does have 
legal capacity, but the EC does not operate any of the PJCCM provisions.  
 
This has caused serous problems in the area of commercial law, 
with a very robust judicial row having developed between the German 
Constitutional Court,56 and the ECJ as to the supremacy of EC law in the 
absence of any concept of Human Rights in EC law.57 The highest court 
in Germany refused, for some time to recognise EC law as being supreme 
to the German Constitution, as there was protection for human rights in 
the German Constitution, but not in the EC Treaty. The judicial argument 
ended up with the ECJ saying that it, the ECJ “has consistently held that 
fundamental rights are an integral part of the general principles” of EC 
law. The subsequent developments of such fundamental rights to meet the 
requirements of a commercial law case have not, however, been without 
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 Under Article 281 EC. 
55
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000 C364/01, the “Nice” charter. 
56
 the Bundesverfassundsgericht.  
57
 The cases here were International Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Enifurh-und Vorratsstelle főr 
Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 2 BvL 52/71), before the Bundesverfassundsgericht, the International 
Handelsgesellschaft case before the ECJ, (Case 11/70, [1970] ECR 1125), Re the application of 
Wőnsche Handelsgesellschaft (Case 2 BvR 197/83) before the Bundesverfassundsgericht, and Case 
46/87, Hoechst v. Commission, [1989] ECR 2859.  
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their problems, as evidenced by the ruling in Opinion 2/94. The ECJ in 
Opinion 2/9458 the ECJ stated that the EC had no legal capacity assigned 
to it by its member states to sign the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In addition the European Convention on Human Rights only has 
states as members. The EC is not a state. However other organisations 
which deal with the core economic issues of the EC have managed to 
accommodate the EC as a member, not least the World Trade 
Organisation.59 This was, however, all before criminal matters became 
such a core “Brussels” issue.  
 
The current situation therefore is that while each of the EC/EU 
member states are members of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and operate its provisions within their domestic jurisdictions, 
there is no interaction between either the supranational EC legal 
jurisdiction or the intergovernmental EU- PJCCM jurisdiction with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, or its court, the European Court 
of Human Rights, (ECHR) which is based in Strasbourg.  
 
The absence or lack of development of such fundamental rights is 
even more of an issue in situations where police and criminal matters 
arise. The new EU Constitution, should it ever come into force, in 
attempting to address this very serious lacuna expresses the intention of 
the “new EU” to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Article I-9.2 EUC. Such a provision, once ratified within the document by 
all member states of the EC/EU would thereby give power to the “new 
EU” to do so.  
 
 
5. Conclusion    
 
 Unlike in EC law, it is not sufficient in PJCCM law, to ask what is 
the content of the legal document in order to get the full legal picture, as, 
for example in the policy area of anti-terrorist measures. It is also 
important to understand the context within which the particular legal tool 
operates in order to fully understand its legal effect. The defective 
constitutional framework within which PJCCM has to operate has been 
graphically referred to by Gormley as being “like a colander to such an 
extent as to make any concept of a European Union in fact a house built 
on sand, appearing solid but without the necessary foundation piles to 
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make it a credible entity”.60  The fact that the Greek temple of the EU, as 
envisaged by Curtain has not yet come down around our ears is very 
much due to good will of all the member states of the EU, with the 
intention of putting in the badly needed structural foundations, in 
particular for PJCCM being behind the drafting of the relevant provisions 
of the proposed EU Constitution. It is down to the internal politics of the 
EU member states whether either the proposed EU Constitution, or the 
relevant PJCCM parts of it ever come into force.   
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